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ABSTRACT 
Node authentication in VANETs is one of the most 
important research topics nowadays. VANETs 
present unique challenges such as high node 
mobility, real-time constraints, scalability, gradual 
deployment and privacy. No existent technique 
addresses all these requirements. In particular, both 
inter-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside wireless 
communications present different characteristics 
that should be taken into account when defining 
node authentication services. That is exactly what is 
done in this paper, where the features of inter-
vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communications are 
analyzed to propose differentiated services for node 
authentication, according to privacy and efficiency 
needs. 
 
1. Introduction 
A Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a 
type of Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork (MANET) 
that is used to provide communications between 
nearby vehicles, and between vehicles and fixed 
infrastructure on the roadside. In particular, 
communications between On-Board Units 
(OBUs) in vehicles are referred to as Vehicle-
TO-Vehicle (V2V) communications, while 
communications between OBUs and Road-Side 
Units (RSUs), which is fixed equipment on the 
road, are referred to as Vehicle-TO-
Infrastructure (V2I) communications.  
These networks may be seen as the most 
promising approach for future Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITSs) because V2V and 
V2I communications will enable not only the 
improvement of safety, efficiency and comfort 
in everyday road travel, but also the offer of 
other value-added services such as commercial 
information or access to Internet.  Note that 
when we talk about improving efficiency of road 
transport, in fact we are talking about reducing 
waste of time and money, dependency on oil, 
environmental contamination, environmental 
impact due to highway construction, etc. 
The security of both types of wireless 
communications is a necessary pre-requisite for 
the general adoption of VANET technology. In 
order to achieve communication security, node 
authentication, which is the main topic of this 
paper, is the most fundamental piece. However, 
authentication in such a mobile environment 
poses a great privacy risk. In this paper group 
formation is proposed as a strategy to strengthen 
privacy and authentication, as well as to 
improve communication efficiency in VANETs. 
This work is organized as follows. Next 
section provides a comparison between 
VANETs and MANETs. Section 3 gives a brief 
background on VANETs. The following five 
sections describe the group-based proposal and 
its differentiated node authentication services. 
Finally, section 9 concludes the paper.  
 
2. VANET versus MANET 
A VANET can be seen as a specific type of 
MANET, in which the following characteristics 
appear [1]:  
1. High node mobility. 
2. Need for scalability of solutions due to 
the usual high height of VANETs. 
3. Nodes do not have restrictions on their 
power, processing and storage capacities. 
4. Need to consider the development 
scenarios (e.g. city or highway). 
In particular, among the characteristics 
indicated in [2] as unique of VANETs, we want 
to remark the following ones: 
• Frequent topology changes. 
• Need of trust and real-time communication. 
• Confidentiality is not required when the 
information is related to the safety. 
• Need for privacy.  
• Possible access to a fixed infrastructure 
along the roadside.  
• Existence of a central registry of vehicles, 
and periodic contact with it.  
• Qualified mechanisms for the exigency of 
the fulfillment of the law.  
On the other hand, when developing a 
VANET simulation, some special characteristics 
of VANETs have to be considered:  
• Each vehicle generally moves according to 
a road network pattern and not at random 
like in MANETs.  
• The movement patterns of vehicles are 
normally occasional, that is to say, they stop, 
move, park, etc.  
• Vehicles must follow speed limitations and 
traffic signals.  
• The behavior of each vehicle depends on 
the one of its neighbor vehicles as well as on 
the road type.  
Despite the aforementioned differences, 
some security tools designed for MANETs are 
nowadays being evaluated for their possible 
application in VANETs [3]. That is the case of 
several proposals described in this work.  
As in MANETs, in VANETs who are in 
charge of package routing are the vehicles 
themselves. In the bibliography, till now several 
routing protocols for MANETs have been 
adapted to VANETs following different 
approaches. Firstly, reactive protocols designed 
for MANETs such as Ad-hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) and Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) have been adapted to VANETs. 
Nevertheless, simulation results do not indicate 
a good performance due to the highly unstable 
routes. Consequently, we can conclude that 
those adaptations might be successfully used 
only in small VANETs. 
 
3. Background on VANETs 
In the near future, VANETs will combine a 
variety of wireless technologies like DSR 
(Dedicated Short Range) communications 
described in the draft of standard for VANETs 
IEEE 802.11p WAVE (Wireless for Access 
Vehicular Environments), with Cellular, 
Satellite and WiMax technologies. Therefore, it 
is expected that each vehicle will have as part of 
its equipment: a black box (EDR, Event Data 
Recorder), a registered identity (ELP, Electronic 
License Plate), a receiver of a Global Navigation 
Satellite System like GPS (Global Positioning 
System) or Galileo, sensors to detect obstacles at 
a distance lesser than 200 ms, and some special 
device that provides it with connectivity to an 
ad-hoc network formed by the vehicles. Such a 
device allows the node to receive and send 
messages through the network. 
Two hypotheses that are necessary to 
guarantee the security of VANETs are that these 
devices are reliable and tamper-proof, and that 
the information received through sensors is also 
trustworthy. It is generally assumed that the 
messages sent through the VANET may be 
digitally signed by the sender with a public-key 
certificate. This certificate is generally emitted 
by a Certification Authority (CA) that is 
admitted as reliable by the whole network. The 
moments corresponding to vehicle purchase and 
to the periodic technical inspections might be 
respectively associated to the emission and 
renovation of its public-key certificate. 
Note that the use of PKIs in VANETs 
implies the problem of the enormous cost of the 
management of a giant CA, with the 
corresponding high consumption of resources. 
Furthermore, it makes it very difficult to deal 
with anonymity. Since public keys should be 
frequently updated in order to protect privacy, it 
becomes impractical that all vehicles store the 
public keys of the remaining nodes. 
Consequently, proposals such as self-organized 
and distributed certification of public keys might 
be good solutions. Note that any of these 
proposals must be combined with a cooperation 
enforcement mechanism between nodes. 
 
4. Groups 
In this paper group formation is proposed as a 
valid strategy to strengthen privacy and provide 
authentication, while reducing communications 
in VANETs. In particular, we propose location-
based group formation according to dynamic 
cells dependent on the characteristics of the 
road, and especially on the average speed. In 
this way, any vehicle that circulates at such a 
speed will belong to the same group within its 
trajectory. We also propose here that the leader 
of each group be the vehicle that has belonged to 
the same group for the longest time.   
According to our proposal, V2V between 
groups will imply package routing from the 
receiving vehicle towards the leader of the 
receiving group, who is in charge of 
broadcasting it to the whole group if necessary. 
If the cells have a radio that is greater than the 
wireless coverage of the OBU, the group 
communication may be carried out by proactive 
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR).  
In the two phases corresponding to group 
formation and node joining, each new node has 
to authenticate itself to the leader through 
asymmetric authentication. Later, the leader 
sends a shared secret key to it, encrypted with 
the public key of the new node. In particular, 
this secret key is shared among all the members 
of the group, and used both for V2V within the 
group and for V2V between groups, as it is 
explained in the following sections. 
In this paper we propose the application of 
different cryptographic primitives for node 
authentication, while paying special attention to 
the efficiency of communications and to the 
need of privacy. In this way, we distinguish four 
different ways of authentication, which are 
analyzed in the following sections: 
• I2V 
• V2I 
• V2V inside groups 
• V2V between groups 
 
5. I2V Authentication 
Since privacy-preserving authentication is not 
necessary in I2V, we propose for such a case the 
use of Identity-Based Cryptography because it 
provides a way to avoid the difficult public-key 
certificate management problem.  
Identity-Based Cryptography is a type of 
public-key cryptography in which the public key 
of a user is some unique information about the 
identity of the user (e.g. the ELP in VANETs). 
The first implementation of an Identity-Based 
scheme was developed by Shamir in 1984 [4], 
which allowed verifying digital signatures by 
using only public information such as the users’ 
identifier. A possible choice for VANETs could 
be based on the modern schemes that include 
Boneh/Franklin's pairing-based encryption 
scheme [5], which is an application of Weil 
pairing over elliptic curves and finite fields. 
 
6. V2I Authentication 
Unlike I2V communication, in V2I 
communications privacy is an essential 
ingredient. Here we propose a challenge-
response authentication protocol based on a 
secret-key approach where each valid user is 
assigned a random key-ring with k keys drawn 
without replacement from a central key pool of 
n keys [6].  
According to the proposed scheme, during 
authentication each user chooses at random a 
subset with c keys from its key-ring, and uses 
them in a challenge-response scheme to 
authenticate itself to the RSU in order to 
establish a session key, which is sent encrypted 
under the RSU’s public key.  
This scheme preserves user privacy due to 
the feature that each symmetric key is with a 
high probability (related to the birthday paradox 
and dependent on the specific choice of 
parameters) shared by several vehicles.  
When a vehicle wants to communicate with 
the RSU, it sends an authentication request 
together with a set of c keys taken at random 
from its key-ring and a timestamp. All this 
information is then encrypted by the established 
session key. Note that a set of keys, instead of 
only one key, is proposed for authentication, 
because there is a high probability for the OBU 
to have one key shared by a large amount of 
vehicles. This makes it difficult to identify a 
possible malicious vehicle if just one key is 
used. However, there is a much lower 
probability that a set of a keys be shared by a 
large number of vehicles, and so it is much 
easier to catch a malicious vehicle in the 
proposal. After the RSU gets the authentication 
request from the vehicle, it creates a challenge 
message by encrypting a random secret with the 
set of keys indicated in the request, by using 
Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode. Upon 
receiving the challenge, the vehicle decrypts the 
challenge with the chosen keys and creates a 
response by encrypting the random secret with 
the session key. Finally, the RSU verifies the 
response and accepts the session key for the next 
communications with the vehicle.  
In the first step, in order to make easier the 
task of checking the key subset indicated in the 
request by the RSU, we propose a tree-based 
version where the central key pool of n keys 
may be represented by a tree with c levels [7]. 
Each user is associated to k/c leaves, and each 
edge represents a secret key.  
In this way, the key-ring of each user is 
formed by several paths from the root to the 
leaves linked to it. During each authentication 
process the user chooses at random one of its 
paths, which may be shared by several users. In 
this way, to check the keys, the RSU has to 
determine which first-level key was used, then, 
it continues by determining which second-level 
key was used but by searching only through 
those second-level keys below the identified 
first-level key. This process continues until all c 
keys are identified, what at the end implies a 
positive and anonymous verification. The key 
point of this proposal is that it implies that the 
RSU reduces considerably the search space each 
time a vehicle is authenticated. 
 
7. V2V Authentication inside Groups 
At the stages of group formation and group 
joining, each new node has to authenticate itself 
to the group leader by using public-key 
signatures [8].  
After group formation or group joining, the 
group leader sends a secret shared key to every 
new member of the group, encrypted with the 
public key of this new node. Such a secret group 
key is afterwards used for any communication 
within the group both for node authentication 
and for secret-key encryption if necessary (e.g. 
for commercial applications). In this way, the 
efficiency of communications inside the group is 
maximized because on the one hand certificate 
management is avoided, and on the other hand, 
secret-key cryptography is in general more 
efficient than public-key.  Note that the use of a 
shared secret key also contributes to the 
protection of privacy. 
 
8. V2V Authentication between Groups 
In order to protect privacy, group signatures are 
proposed for node authentication between 
groups. A group signature scheme is a method 
for allowing a member of a group to 
anonymously sign a message on behalf of the 
group so that everybody can verify such a 
signature with the public key of the group. This 
group signature identifies the signer as a valid 
member of the group and does not allow 
distinguishing among different group members. 
This concept was first introduced by Chaum and 
van Heyst in 1991 [9].  
Essential for a group signature scheme is the 
group leader, who is in charge of adding group 
members and has the ability to reveal the 
original signer in the event of disputes. In our 
proposal, the group leader issues a private key to 
each vehicle within the group, which uniquely 
identifies each vehicle, and at the same time 
allows it to compute a group signature and prove 
its validity without revealing its identity. In this 
way, any vehicle from any group will be able to 
communicate with any vehicle belonging to 
other group anonymously. In particular, our 
proposal for group signature is based on the 
cryptographic primitive of bilinear pairings, 
which was also proposed for I2V authentication.  
 
9. Conclusions 
VANETs represent a challenge in the field of 
communications security, as well as a revolution 
for vehicular safety, comfort and efficiency in 
road transport. In this paper we have briefly 
described different services for node 
authentication in VANETs, which depend on the 
participants in the process. For I2V, since there 
is no need of privacy, Identity-Based 
cryptography is proposed in order to avoid 
certificates management. In the remaining cases, 
privacy is a must. In V2I we propose a 
challenge-response authentication protocol that 
uses a secret-key approach based on random 
key-trees. Such a proposal provides an efficient 
solution for anonymous authentication, 
especially if the branching factor at the first 
levels of the tree is maximized.  
In this work, groups are proposed as the 
most efficient way to save communications. On 
the one hand, in order to provide privacy 
between groups, we proposed group signatures. 
On the other hand, for V2V inside groups, 
secret-key authentication is the basis of the 
proposed solution.  
Since this is a work in progress, a future 
version will include many questions that have 
been left open here. Some of those questions are 
the concrete definitions of each proposal, the 
analysis of interactions among them, the 
comparison with other previous solutions, and 
the implementation of the different schemes 
using free software NS-2 (Network Simulator 
2). 
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